



Civil Aviation Authority

# AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

Number: G-2022-0007

Issue date: 12 April 2022



Note: In this Airworthiness Directive, references to EU regulations are to those regulations as retained and amended in UK domestic law under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and are referenced as "UK Regulation (EU) year/number or UK Regulation (EU) No. number/year".

This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by the UK CAA in accordance with UK Regulation (EU) No. 748/2012 Part 21.A.3B, acting as the Authority of the State of Design for the affected product(s), under Article 34 of the Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) and UK Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.

In accordance with UK Regulation (EU) No. 1321/2014 Annex I (Part-M), M.A.301 / Annex VB (Part-ML), ML.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified or agreed by the CAA [Part-M, M.A.303 / Part-ML, ML.A.303].

**Design Approval Holder's Name:**

**Modification(s):**

STC TWENTY ONE LIMITED

VIP cabin interior

Effective Date:	26 April 2022
STC Numbers:	EASA STC 10035344, 10054019, 10074112
Foreign AD (if applicable):	Not Applicable
Superseding AD:	Not Applicable

## ATA 52 - Doors – Emergency Exit – Functional Check

---

**Manufacturer(s):**

STC Twenty One Limited

**Applicability:**

Airbus A320-214 & A320-251N aeroplanes modified by STC21 change reference S21.25-03-1474, S21.25-03-1608 or S21.25-03-1683:

Aircraft Model No.	Aircraft Serial No.	EASA STC	STC Approval Date
A320-214	4199	S21.25-03-1474	16/06/2011
A320-214	6069	S21.25-03-1608	14/07/2015
A320-251N	8638	S21.25-03-1683	26/08/2020

**Definitions:**

**STC21:** Refers to the organisation STC TWENTY ONE LIMITED

**Reason:**

As part of a design change to install a new VIP cabin interior, changes were made to the overwing exit slide reservoirs. These design changes are detailed under S21.25-03-1474 / S21.25-03-1608 / S21.25-03-1683. To verify the design change, both automatic and manual functional checks were performed and the results of these checks indicated difficulty in opening the overwing exits. In this condition, operation of the overwing exit hatch would not automatically deploy the slide.

Upon investigation, it was found that the slide release levers, which form part of the slide mechanism, were not able to fully rotate due to a mechanical interference with part of the interior side wall. It could not be positively determined if this problem was specific to the aircraft being modified or whether aircraft in service could be affected by the same issue.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could prevent deployment of the emergency escape slide.

To address this potential unsafe condition, STC21 issued Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193. This service bulletin contains details of a functional check that operators can perform to detect whether the problem exists on their aircraft.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a functional check to be performed and reporting of the results of the check back to the manufacturer.

**Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):**

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

**(1) Functional Check:**

Within 1 month after the effective date of this AD, perform functional check as per STC21 Limited Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 Issue 1.

If during the functional check, as required by STC21 Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193, any difficulty is identified with operation of slide release levers, then before next flight, STC21 should be contacted to establish necessary corrective action.

**(2) Corrective action:**

Before further flight, perform any corrective actions identified by STC21 resulting from the functional check in (1).

**(3) Reporting:**

On completion of the functional check, complete the Feedback section of S21.SB-0193 and send to STC21 via the info@stc21.co.uk email address including a record of the MSN of the aircraft checked.

**(4) Credit:**

Functional check(s) accomplished in accordance with STC21 Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 before the effective date of this AD is/are acceptable to comply with the requirements of this AD.

**Reference Publications:**

Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 Issue 1, 26 November 2021

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

**Remarks:**

1. This AD was originally posted on 03 March 2022 as PAD 1995 for consultation until 31 March 2022. No comments were received during the consultation period.
2. If requested and appropriately substantiated, CAA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
3. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the CAA aviation safety reporting system [Occurrence reporting | Civil Aviation Authority](#). This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this AD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
4. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to: [Continued.Airworthiness@caa.co.uk](mailto:Continued.Airworthiness@caa.co.uk)
5. For any questions concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: STC Twenty One Limited, The Waldorf Centre, 1290 London Road, Alvaston, Derby, DE24 8QP, +44 (0) 1332 576830. Email [info@stc21.co.uk](mailto:info@stc21.co.uk)