



Civil Aviation Authority

PROPOSED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE



Number: 1995

Issue date: 03 March 2022

In accordance with the CAA Continuing Airworthiness Procedures, the issuance of an Airworthiness Directive (AD) is proposed which will be applicable to the aeronautical product(s) identified below.

All interested persons may send their comments, referencing the PAD Number above, to the e-mail address specified in the 'Remarks' section, prior to the consultation date indicated.

Design Approval Holder's Name:

Modification(s):

STC TWENTY ONE LIMITED

VIP cabin interior

Effective Date:	TBD upon issue of final AD
STC Numbers:	EASA STC 10035344, 10054019, 10074112
Foreign AD (if applicable):	Not Applicable
Superseding AD:	Not Applicable

ATA 52 - Doors – Emergency Exit – Functional Check

Manufacturer(s):

STC Twenty One Limited

Applicability:

Airbus A320-214 & A320-251N aeroplanes modified by STC21 change reference S21.25-03-1474, S21.25-03-1608 or S21.25-03-1683:

Aircraft Model No.	Aircraft Serial No.	EASA STC	STC Approval Date
A320-214	4199	S21.25-03-1474	16/06/2011
A320-214	6069	S21.25-03-1608	14/07/2015
A320-251N	8638	S21.25-03-1683	26/08/2020

Definitions:

STC21: Refers to the organisation STC TWENTY ONE LIMITED

Reason:

As part of a design change to install a new VIP cabin interior, changes were made to the overwing exit slide reservoirs. These design changes are detailed under S21.25-03-1474 / S21.25-03-1608 / S21.25-03-1638. To verify the design change, both automatic and manual functional checks were performed and the results of these checks indicated difficulty in opening the overwing exits. In this condition, operation of the overwing exit hatch would not automatically deploy the slide.

Upon investigation, it was found that the slide release levers, which form part of the slide mechanism, were not able to fully rotate due to a mechanical interference with part of the interior side wall. It could not be positively determined if this problem was specific to the aircraft being modified or whether aircraft in service could be affected by the same issue.

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could prevent deployment of the emergency escape slide.

To address this potential unsafe condition, STC21 issued Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193. This service bulletin contains details of a functional check that operators can perform to detect whether the problem exists on their aircraft.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires a functional check to be performed and reporting of the results of the check back to the manufacturer.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

(1) Functional Check:

Within 1 month after the effective date of this AD, perform functional check as per STC21 Limited Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 Issue 1.

If during the functional check, as required by STC 21 Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193, any difficulty is identified with operation of slide release levers, then before next flight, STC 21 Ltd should be contacted to establish necessary corrective action.

(2) Corrective action:

Before further flight, perform any corrective actions identified by STC 21 resulting from the functional check in (1).

(3) Reporting:

On completion of the functional check, complete the Feedback section of S21.SB-0193 and send to STC 21 via the info@stc21.co.uk email address including a record of the MSN of the aircraft checked.

(4) Credit:

Functional check(s) accomplished in accordance with STC 21 Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 before the effective date of this AD is/are acceptable to comply with the requirements of this AD.

Reference Publications:

Service Bulletin S21.SB-0193 Issue 1, 8 November 2021.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

Remarks:

1. This PAD will be closed for consultation on 31 March 2022.
2. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this PAD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this PAD, can be reported to the CAA aviation safety reporting system. This may include reporting on the same or similar components, other than those covered by the design to which this PAD applies, if the same unsafe condition can exist or may develop on an aircraft with those components installed. Such components may be installed under an FAA Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) or other modification.
3. Enquiries regarding this PAD should be referred to: Continued.Airworthiness@caa.co.uk
4. For any questions concerning the technical content of the requirements in this PAD, please contact: STC Twenty One Limited, The Waldorf Centre, 1290 London Road, Alvaston, Derby, DE24 8QP, +44 (0) 1332 576830.