

**CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY**  
**MINUTES OF THE 548<sup>th</sup> BOARD MEETING HELD ON**  
**WEDNESDAY 16 DECEMBER 2020, 12:00, on Microsoft Teams**

**Present:**

Sir Stephen Hillier  
Richard Moriarty  
Rob Bishton  
Katherine Corich  
Marykay Fuller  
AVM Ian Gale  
David King  
Anne Lambert  
Paul Smith  
Chris Tingle  
Graham Ward  
Kate Staples

Chair

Secretary and General Counsel

**Apologies:**

None

**In Attendance:**

Ben Alcott  
Jane Cosgrove  
Peter Drissell  
Tim Johnson  
Jonathan Nicholson

as Interim Communications Director

Philip Clarke

Barbara Perata-Smith

Minute-taker

Glenn Bradley

for item 6

David Malins

for item 6

Phil Dykins

for item 9

Nicky Keeley

for item 9

Norma Hasting

for item 10

## **I. APOLOGIES AND INTRODUCTIONS**

1. No apologies were received.

## **II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, PREVIOUS MINUTES AND MATTERS ARISING**

2. No new conflicts of interest were declared.
3. The minutes for the 18 November 2020 meeting were approved with some minor changes and would be published online in due course.
4. The matters arising from previous meetings were noted.

## **III. CHAIR'S REPORT (DOC 2020-95) BY SIR STEPHEN HILLIER**

5. The Chair summarised a number of headline points for discussion.
  - The risk profile in the sector during the Covid recovery phase when it comes: although industry had made progress in recognising this ongoing issue, CAA would need to see evidence of the practical measures in place to mitigate the risks.
  - The Secretary of State's Priorities Letter had been shared with colleagues. This was an integral part of the planning process as one of a number of important inputs into our strategy and business planning processes.
  - Spending Review 20 (SR20): although CAA's core capabilities would be supported by DfT money, there was still uncertainty on whether the ambition projects would also be funded. Discussions were ongoing and more detail would be provided today under item 4.
  - The conversation on the Max 8 would also take place at today's meeting and would be followed by an Extraordinary Board Meeting on 13 January 2021.
  - The People Strategy would be discussed under item 10, focusing on the deliverables and the Board's role in assuring progress.
6. The Board noted the update.

## **IV. CHIEF EXECUTIVE REPORT (DOC 2020-96) BY RICHARD MORIARTY**

7. Richard Moriarty requested one approval and one item to note from the Board and provided an update on a number of live issues.

### **Approvals and items to note**

8. Item 1: Mr Moriarty invited the Board to note the ASSI's Business Plan. Graham Ward commented that section two of the report included an expression of opinion by the ASSI Board which would need evidence to substantiate. Ben Alcott took an action to explore with the ASSI's CEO.

**ACTION:** Ben Alcott

9. Item 2: Mr Moriarty asked the Board to delegate the final modifications and closing of the Gatwick Airport Limited's economic regulation licence to Paul Smith and Andrew Walker, with support from the legal team. Mr Smith confirmed that the team would return to the Board if substantial new issues were raised by stakeholders or stakeholders appeared likely to formally challenge any final decision.
10. The Board approved the delegation, subject to the above requirement.

### **Live issues**

11. Passenger Locator Form (PLF): Mr Moriarty explained that the Government was working towards an updated implementation strategy of PLF, and work was on going to determine how passenger and airline compliance would be enforced. Government was keen for airlines to ensure passengers completed the form before boarding. Longer term an integrated IT solution was likely to be required.
12. AVM Ian Gale enquired about our role and responsibility in this matter. In its proposed legislation, the Government had tasked the CAA with undertaking an enforcement role in relation to airline compliance with the new PLF regulations.
13. Wellbeing: Mr Moriarty ran through the emerging headlines from the wellbeing survey carried out in November, which had been completed by around 900 colleagues. Although the percentage of staff that thought CAA cared about their wellbeing had decreased to 74% from 81% in the Summer, the absolute value was still very high. Statistics on workload and pressure were trending up, but these were balanced by appropriate support provided by managers. The team would work to break down the data by department to identify any hotspots and develop plans to address issues. The Chair commented that there could be a correlation between the hot spots and the shortage of resource. Jane Cosgrove said that we are tracking recruitment closely and that the library pack contained information on current resourcing levels and that in future the data would be provided in a table format for ease of reference. The effects of the recruitment freeze during the first half of the financial year 2020/21 were now flattening out due to the increase in recruitment activity and actual budget is being helped by a very low, and decreasing, staff turnover.
14. David King added that, although it was sensible to carry out the analysis, it did not help to understand how close people were to becoming unwell from work pressures. Ben Alcott said that the survey data had indicated that manager support – and thus the mechanics to ensure wellbeing – was in place. Team-level reports would provide further insights. The Wellbeing Board was working on a refreshed

- strategy and on a campaign of activities, including the launch of the headspace app, to ensure wellbeing tools were accessible to colleagues.
15. AVM Gale commented that CAA was very similar to the MoD which had also run a wellbeing survey, which had showed an organisation affected by the uncertainty of the external environment and by challenging work programmes. Data collection was an effective way of identifying hot spots and addressing the problems.
  16. The Chair summarised the discussion and added that change and crisis adaptation was an ever-present feature of our work, not something that happened periodically, and should be considered as something we need to be prepared to manage with on an ongoing basis. The organisation needed to reach a position whereby, in the event of a crisis, it could de-prioritise work quickly, which necessitate some clear instructions to and procedures for colleagues.
  17. Mr Moriarty said that the team would return to the Board once the survey data had been analysed and disaggregated into team levels.
  18. Legal: Kate Staples provided an update on the Shoreham matter and confirmed that the cognitive review report had now been published. Separately, OGC were considering the implications for the inquest of a recent Supreme Court case concerning the applicable standard of proof in inquest proceedings.
  19. Airspace infringements: Mr Moriarty made the Board aware of a complaint against CAA with regard to its airspace infringement processes. It had been alleged the processes were legally flawed. In addressing the complaint, we would be cognisant of the need to consider the allegations, any associated ongoing and new legal cases and consider how to enhance transparency and improve stakeholder participation. Once the review was completed, we would provide an update to the Board.
  20. Refunds: the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) was continuing its investigation on airline refunds in the context of a 'frustration of contract', with CAA supporting the work.
  21. Heathrow Airport expansion: Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL) won the appeal against the government and the Court of Appeal's judgement that the Paris Agreement had not been properly considered in the Airports National Policy Statement. We would monitor the situation to see how it developed once recovery started.
  22. The Chair noted that the two items specified on the agenda under the CEO's Report had not been discussed explicitly at the meeting, but a briefing had been included in the Library.
  23. The Board noted the report.

**V. FINANCE REPORT FOR THE SEVEN MONTHS TO 31 OCTOBER 2020 (DOC 2020-97) BY CHRIS TINGLE**

24. Chris Tingle provided an update on the current year finances, on the forecast for the following year and on the outcome of the Spending Review 2020 (SR20). He added that the current year figures were still tracking ahead of the Covid budget, which had been agreed with DfT last April. The positive variance was expected to continue, and he was looking to balance further risk and opportunities during the remainder of the financial year.
25. Graham Ward said that he supported Mr Tingle's approach to the spending profile and asked whether the improvements to the pension deficit were due to the performance of the investment in relation to the markets. Mr Tingle explained that the deficit had reduced, but that he was reluctant to increase contributions before the next valuation in December 2021.
26. Marykay Fuller commented that although she supported making full use of available funds, in light of the results of the wellbeing survey, where colleagues had expressed feeling under pressure, there was a risk that ramping up project work might put even more pressure on an already stretched workforce. Richard Moriarty added that employing temporary staff might also cause resource pressures in the following years, once the contractors have left.
27. Mr Tingle moved onto discussing the budget for 2021/22 and the SR20 and noted we had verbal confirmation from DfT on the outcome of the review: the revenue shortfall from user charges that was necessary to support our core capabilities would be covered with taxpayer funding, with further funding to cover work related to the EU Exit transition.
28. Mr Tingle added that there was currently no additional funding allocated for the security maturity and automation blueprint projects, as well as a shortage of funding for some parts of Horizon and for a number of the ambition activities specified in the Secretary of State's Priorities Letter. The team would compare the budget with the SR20 bid to identify potential areas of flexibility. DfT's updated figures for next year's traffic volumes were similar to last summer's so our forecast was still applicable, though we and DfT would need to keep this under review.
29. The Chair commented that DfT's continued willingness to financially underpin our core regulatory activities was welcome, albeit some of our ambition bids had not been successful which would impact the pace of delivery and on the timeline for their delivery.

30. Ms Fuller enquired about the approach to security maturity. More details on this work would be discussed under item 9.
31. Mr Tingle confirmed that further updates on the SR20 would be provided at later Board meetings. He noted that the SR20 settlement was a one-year arrangement and we would be considering a longer-term funding request as part of the next Spending Review process for 2022 onwards.
32. The Board noted the report.

## **VI. SARG MONTHLY SAFETY ISSUES REPORT (DOC 2020-87) BY ROB BISHTON**

33. The Board welcomed Glenn Bradley and David Malins to the meeting.
34. Rob Bishton focused on the Covid 19 response work and assured the Board that priorities were well balanced between the commercial and GA sectors. He added that one of the biggest learning from this challenging year had been that PBR could not be considered the panacea for all oversight: while it was a useful tool, key risk analysis had brought significant benefits, supported by comprehensive data gathering and analysis.
35. The recovery was bringing uncertainty on whether industry, by the summer, would exit the crisis in a measurable and sustainable way or in stops and starts. Either approach would require real time oversight to understand how the entity was addressing the challenges brought by the pandemic, such as whether it had the necessary capacity and capability to return to full operations quickly, without undermining safety or customer service. Mr Bishton said that a regular report summarising the latest developments on industry recovery would be submitted to the Board on a regular basis from January 2021.
36. David King commented that he had attended the SARG Leadership meeting, where there had been a good discussion on the issues. He added that the reduced site visits were bringing challenges, such as the ability to gather data to the appropriate depth and to trust the information provided by entities through their own SMSs, to create a picture that was accurate and reliable. Mr Bishton said that he met regularly with the Safety Directors from other organisations to address these issues and added that because relationships had recently formed the basis of our interactions with industry, we also needed to ensure these were appropriate. The Chair encouraged the team to follow an all-CAA approach for the recovery, bringing together safety, security and consumer interests.
37. With regard to the headline risks, Mr Bishton noted that the risk to cargo oversight was aligned between safety and security and would become more high-profile for both departments during the recovery. On dangerous goods, Andrew Broadhead

was carrying out an assurance assessment, however, we would need to understand this risk was a global risk and thus managed across the business, not just by a safety specialist.

38. Mr Bishton added that Risk 10 could soon become Risk 1, if the risk associated with the Max 8 changed as a result of forthcoming decisions in a number of countries including the UK. Teams were empowered to take regulatory measures if required, such as introducing restrictions, to mitigate the risk.
39. The Chair referred to the steer requested in Mr Bishton's report to advise the team on the feasibility of offering support to projects requiring testing and evaluation of military equipment through civil regulation and noted that, although more information would need to be provided to the Board before a formal approval could be granted, the Board supported the intention for the work in principle. Mr Bishton said that some of these projects could be carried out by collaborating with CAAi and confirmed he would return to the Board with options.

**ACTION:** Rob Bishton

40. The Board noted the report.

## **VII. MAX 8 RETURN TO SERVICE (DOC 2020-99) BY ROB BISHTON**

41. The Chair reminded the Board that the purpose of today's discussion was to assure itself of the overall process followed by CAA thus far, and to ask for additional information and inputs prior to any return to service decision being made by the CAA. The CAA's work supplemented that carried out by the FAA and EASA.
42. Kate Staples explained the legal foundations of the decision that would be taken in early 2021. Ms Staples explained that within the overarching corporate governance framework experienced and qualified colleagues were accountable on a day-to-day basis for making safety and other regulatory decisions, based on sound evidence. In this case, as in all cases, the CAA Board was to ensure that decisions about a return to service and re-opening airspace would be made based on appropriate technical knowledge, selection and implementation of suitable methodologies and robust processes, and following scrutiny of relevant evidence.
43. Richard Moriarty added that, as well as assuring itself of the process, the Board needed to be comfortable on how we would position ourselves publicly, while we navigated the outcome. Today's paper was prepared with this in mind, aiming for a transparent publication when appropriate. Chris Tingle enquired whether there would be any requirements on us if we did not agree with the FAA's decision. Ms Staples explained that the same framework would apply. If the CAA disagreed with the FAA's conclusions and position it would be necessary for the specialist teams

in SARG, led by Rob Bishton, to identify the points of difference, and explain them clearly to the Board to ensure it understood the rationale and could be assured of the process and support the position.

44. David Malins reminded the Board of the international legal framework in which global aviation operated. The system was based on the mutual acceptance of and trust in operators from other States and the nature, extent and quality of oversight provided by those States and their national aviation authorities. Operators of the Boeing 737 Max were all subject to oversight by national aviation authorities in Contracting States, which had to act in accordance with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes. In that way, Mr Malins explained, once final decisions were taken the CAA would allow G-Reg Max aircraft to operate, provided they were compliant with any airworthiness directive issued by the CAA and according to CAA oversight protocols. This approach had been taken in relation to the Max ferry flight.
45. Mr Malins explained that the team had had close engagement with EASA throughout their programme of work, had followed EASA's process of analysis and oversight, had raised challenge where further investigation was required and asked questions throughout. The CAA team had always borne in mind the FAA's role as certifying authority and EASA's role as validating authority. The fundamental aspects that the team had focused on included the following.
  - The team had carried out a joint piece of work with Boeing and Collins (the software supplier) to understand how software changes were implemented, addressing the MCAS shortcoming.
  - It had worked on the crew recognition and response to warning, which was addressed with training and revisions to procedures.
  - It had covered a number of peripheral issues in the deep dive, which it had wanted to cover but that had not related to unsafe conditions.
  - It had ensured that EASA had the right level of challenge towards the FAA.
46. Mr Malins added that, prior to a return to commercial operations by a UK operator, the team would conduct full oversight of the operator's return to service plans, including its pilot training programmes, implementation of the required aircraft modifications and any outstanding maintenance actions. This would follow a similar oversight process that was used to permit the ferry flight, as previously agreed with the Board. Third country operators (TCO) of the Boeing 737 Max 8 would comply with their respective State of Registry requirements, including Airworthiness and Operator Directives. Compliance with these directives would be the responsibility of the national aviation authority.



47. The Chair asked the Board for comments, in particular whether members needed further information to aid their understanding.
48. Graham Ward enquired whether the team could provide assurance that the work carried out by EASA and the FAA had been done to the same standards we would have adhered to. Mr Malins explained that the CAA airworthiness team would continue to be challenged by the CAA's technical experts, which provided an additional layer of scrutiny.
49. Chris Tingle asked how we could be sure of the standards of non-UK operators. Mr Bishton referred back to the international legal framework, whereby third country operators would need to comply with their respective State of Registry requirements. He added that the team would be working with David Kendrick to issue a TCO (Third Country Operator) Certificate. Additionally, the team would carry out some targeted inspection activity and bilateral conversations with those airlines operating the Max 8 aircraft.
50. Marykay Fuller enquired about the different approaches taken by the FAA and EASA in respect of the operation of the aircraft. Glenn Bradley explained that the only difference would be the option for the crew to pull the circuit breaker if the stick shaker became a distraction, but that that option was available anyway as a commander of an aircraft. David King commented that the difference of approach would be confusing to the layperson. The Chair added that this was an important point: our communications would be focused on reporting transparently all of the issues that had been covered by the analysis, including clearly explaining complex issues, such as this one. Mr Bishton highlighted that the key issue was that there was a difference between option and requirement: pulling the circuit breaker to stop the stick shaker was an option, not a requirement, and this difference presented no material concern for us.
51. Anne Lambert requested improvements to the flowchart, to itemise the steps of the process and aid understanding. She also asked whether we should publish the names of the airlines that would be using the Max 8, as the public would be interested in the information. Mr Malins confirmed that details would be added to the second iteration of the flowchart, including a list of airlines using the aircraft.

**ACTION:** Rob Bishton, David Malins
52. Katherine Corich enquired whether, by working closely with EASA, we had accidentally fallen into 'group think' and so missed important issues. Mr Malins replied that the majority of the activity had been led independently and that the team had generated many questions for EASA, and chased satisfactory replies, so 'group think' would be unlikely. We had not agreed with EASA every step of the

way. Richard Moriarty suggested asking Andrew Broadhead to conduct a brief review, to address this point and provide insight ahead of the final decision.

**ACTION:** Rob Bishton

53. AVM Ian Gale observed that, although we might not have fallen into 'group think', we had scrutinised one aircraft type as no other aircraft ever had been, and we should explore this fact in more detail at a later date.
54. Ms Corich enquired about the balance between risk-based analysis versus time spent on test flights in the review. Mr Bishton explained that both EASA and the FAA had carried out test flights to support their desk-based, analytical work, generating over 100 recommendations in various reports, each of which the team had considered in full. Mr Malins added that, when possible, the team would visit the Boeing factory to see the aircraft off the production line.
55. At the end of the session, Mr Bishton emphasised that the focus should remain on the Board gaining assurance that the process CAA followed in relation this aircraft type and within the current framework was thorough and robust. Mr Bishton enquired whether an additional session would be beneficial to clarify the outstanding issues.
56. The Chair commented that, in order to assure the Board, the team should set down the questions and issues that had been raised and their related answers: although Board colleagues had asked a number of questions, none were left unanswered. If a note documenting the assurance provided were circulated, Board members could peruse it and confirm their agreement.

**ACTION:** Rob Bishton, David Malins

57. Mr King added that he did feel assured and he understood the international arrangements, as well as the fact that the Max 8 aircraft had undergone much more scrutiny than any other aircraft. Having the issues set out, particularly around the minor differences involving third countries and how these played in the arrangements, should be enough to be satisfactory.
58. Ms Corich requested a reminder of the actions so far. She commented that the team had done a thorough job and noted that as we got closer to the point of decision it would only be natural to ask deeper questions.
59. The Chair summarised the discussion, which he deemed to have been productive, with a number of takeaways:
  - assurance that the EASA process had been up to our standard and had been challenged sufficiently to provide a satisfactory outcome;
  - assurance that the analysis and decisions had been carried out with an independent mind by the team, avoiding 'group think';

- further insight on international differences and on other NAAs' standards of operation when in our airspace;
- further insight into the roles of EASA and the FAA.

**ACTION:** Rob Bishton, David Malins

60. The Board noted the report.

### **VIII. BREXIT PREPAREDNESS – END OF TRANSITION DASHBOARD (DOC 2020-100) BY TIM JOHNSON**

61. Tim Johnson highlighted a number of key points from the dashboard.

- Preparations were proceeding well, with permits and licences being issued and the ACC3 database being populated. Some personnel licence transfer requests had been submitted after the deadline date and were being processed as quickly as possible, though this could not be guaranteed to be by the end of the calendar year.
- Contingency plans to cover the Christmas and New Year period were in place, with staff on a roster and subject matter specialists on call. These colleagues would be able to assist the small number of companies that had not made adequate preparations and that were trying to catch up. This was despite an intensive communications campaign and an active microsite with detailed information available and easily accessible.
- The team had briefed Aviation Minister Robert Courts MP on preparedness and contingencies and explained that some issues would be added to the dashboard to be addressed in the medium term.

62. Mr Johnson concluded by saying it continued to be a whole-CAA effort, with collaboration from a range of teams taking place. Richard Moriarty added that colleagues had voluntarily joined the roster, motivated by their willingness to support industry and do things well, so credit was once again due to our people.

63. The Chair commented that it was inevitable that not all industry would be ready for the transition, but that the forward look could be helpful in identifying strategic issues that would need to be included in the Horizon work.

64. The Board noted the report.

### **IX. CYBER SECURITY OVERSIGHT ANNUAL UPDATE AND AVIATION SECURITY QUARTERLY REPORT (DOC 2020-101) BY PETER DRISSELL**

65. The Board welcomed Phil Dykins and Nicky Keeley to the meeting.

66. Cyber Security: Ms Keeley ran through the key points of the report and said that the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) had recently completed its risk

assessment for transport and noted that the aviation industry continued to be a target for cyber-attacks, in part also due to the pandemic pushing companies to remote working practices. The cyber team had been working with the operators of essential services to address these challenges and deliver oversight.

67. Ms Keeley added that the team had seen a significant increase in the scope of cyber regulation – up to 261 entities in 2021 – including additional areas such as UAS, space, airworthiness and state of design. This was starting to put pressure on resources. Although costs were recovered through the scheme of charges, there had been an impact because of the pandemic.
68. Richard Moriarty commented that industry was under financial pressure which might push them to cut costs in certain areas, including cyber security. Ms Keeley said that, rather than considering any blanket extensions, the team had opted for an incremental but consistent approach whereby entities were provided with guidance to complete the Statement of Assurance and then supported through the implementation.
69. The Chair enquired about the scalability of the cyber oversight model and Ms Keeley explained that the feature had been built into the model from the start by commissioning the ASSURE regulatory framework rather than setting up an in-house solution. As technology increased, the requirements to protect systems from cyber-attacks would become more important.
70. The Chair asked about resource issues in light of the increase in scope. Ms Keeley replied that it was a difficult recruitment market but that the team focused on recruiting cyber expertise rather than specific aviation-related experience and tried to promote exciting, challenging and leading-edge role that attracted as much interest as possible.
71. Aviation Security Regulation: Phil Dykins said that the team continued to work with DfT to provide advice on industry requests for temporary alleviations in regulation, as well as supporting and offering guidance to entities on the above variations and, more broadly, on how risks and issues could be factored into recovery planning. A review of UK measures that sat above EU baseline had been carried out, identifying 21 priority areas: the team was in the process of collating evidence from industry and providing a risk assessment and recommendations to DfT. The work should be completed in the next three months. The EU Exit also continued to create significant work, as was the ICAO Security Audit scheduled for May 2021, the first full audit for over a decade. And finally, following agreement at ministerial level, CAA was supporting DfT in

a programme designed to enhance existing close collaboration and support mutual recognition of UK and US security standards. Mr Drissell added that this approach was consistent with Mr Bishton's in the safety area and was risk-based.

72. David King commented that one of the critical areas during recovery would be airport support facilities, which might have been subject to large staff losses and that would need to be resourced rapidly. Mr Dykins assured the Board that the team had the capability to address this risk. Vetting had previously been and still was one of the biggest challenges, as it required time and industry needed to factor it into their planning. The team was continuing to communicate these points to industry.
73. Aviation Security Compliance: Mr Drissell noted that the level of compliance monitoring had fallen to about half that from the previous six months, while regulatory oversight remained at roughly the same level. The team had seen increased activity in air cargo oversight and no observable dip in overall industry performance. Auditors continued to be deployed in the field, applying robust personal risk management which had resulted in AvSec having no operationally related cases of Covid to date.
74. The Board noted the reports.

#### **X. CAA PEOPLE STRATEGY: FINAL SUBMISSION (DOC 2020-106) BY JANE COSGROVE**

75. The Board welcomed Norma Hastings to the meeting.
76. Jane Cosgrove introduced the paper and explained that the team had addressed the comments from the discussion at the November Board, by better articulating how the strategy fitted within Horizon; it had gained collective agreement from ExCo on activities and metrics; it was still exploring the Financial Reporting Council's guidance to set out how RemCo and NomCo should be included in the CAA's governance. Ms Cosgrove added that the RAG status included in the paper had been set out for illustrative purposes only, to test reactions to the proposed format for the monthly report and noted that the strategy was based on the current landscape and aimed at providing a framework to reprioritise activities, should there be the need to respond to further crises.
77. The Chair confirmed these points reflected the feedback received at the previous meeting and asked the Board to approve the shared accountabilities set out in slide three, particularly noting the roles and responsibilities, including those of the Board, the need for it to be a leading strategy and reflecting on whether the

strategy had achieved a balance between ambition and capacity. Ms Cosgrove added that the launch of the People Strategy would include an explanation of how the values work in harmony and are embedded in all processes and systems.

78. Marykay Fuller questioned the number of surveys colleagues were expected to complete. Ms Cosgrove replied that the Employee Engagement Survey had not been done in over three years and that it was an essential tool to be able to baseline the issues in the organisation and check that nothing vital had been missed before the People Strategy was launched. All surveys were generally followed with an action plan by department, to address the findings, so colleagues could see activity taking place.
79. Marykay Fuller further enquired whether the aims and construct of the proposed “shadow board” had been agreed since the last conversation. Richard Moriarty explained that the “shadow board” concept had unanimous support from ExCo and the Board but required further clarity on its purpose and a title to reflect that. It was being designed by a cross-cutting team who was pushing for meaty topics to explore and was keen on mentoring and cross-mentoring with Board members, ExCo members and NEDs. Ms Fuller commented that the plan sounded promising but questioned whether the purpose of the board had been fully realised. Katherine Corich agreed and suggested both concepts should be explored. Paul Smith added that the team should better understand the objective of the group before attempting to design a solution and Ms Fuller commented that the “shadow board” should bring diversity of thinking and the squad could unlock opportunities for those with potential to engage with the Board, NEDs and ExCo and enable professional development.
80. Mr Moriarty said that we should aspire to do both, but that we should start with the “shadow board” as the concept had already been scoped, while the other area could be explored separately. The Chair agreed.
81. The Chair asked the Board to endorse the People Strategy, as per the requirements set out in slide 3 of the paper. The Board approved the People Strategy and noted the report.

## **XI. FORWARD AGENDA AND ANY OTHER BUSINESS**

82. The Forward Agenda was not discussed due to time limitations.
83. AVM Ian Gale left the meeting at 17:00, due to a previous commitment.
84. AOBs included the following:
85. Recognitions: the Chair noted that Tim Johnson had been included in the list of Agile 50 leaders by apolitical/World Economic Forum. Mr Johnson commented

that this was for the CAA's work establishing its Innovation Hub, and therefore the credit was largely due to that teams and its leaders.

86. Richard Moriarty mentioned that Kate Staples's team had been awarded both the European non-Financial Regulatory Legal Team of the Year and the Global non-Financial Regulatory Legal Team of the Year.
87. The Board congratulated both Mr Johnson and Ms Staples and their respective teams for the achievements.
88. The Chair and Mr Moriarty expressed their thanks to the Board for their support, expertise and contributions in this challenging year.

**Date and Time of Next Meetings:**

**Wednesday 20 January 2021, 11:00 hours, on Microsoft Teams**