

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

**ACCIDENT TO DIAMOND DA62, G-MDME, INBOUND TO R/W 30L AT
DUBAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ON 16 MAY 2019**

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F4/2020
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 5th August 2020
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 201909599
UAE AAIS REPORT : AIFN/0007/2019

SYNOPSIS

From the UAE AAIS Final Report

The mission required the aircraft to fly several approaches to, and low passes over, runway 30L. At 19:29, after uneventfully completing nine approaches, the aircraft commenced its tenth approach and joined the Final for runway 30L, following a Thai Airways Airbus A350-900 which was on approach to the parallel runway 30R. The A350 was approximately 3.7 nautical miles (nm) and 90 seconds ahead of the DA62.

When the DA62 turned onto the Final leg, it levelled off at an altitude of approximately 1,300 feet and an airspeed of 120 knots (kt). Shortly after, it rolled slightly to the left, lost approximately 100 ft altitude, and was recovered after nine seconds.

Seven seconds later, the Aircraft abruptly rolled to the left until it became inverted and it entered a steep dive. The Aircraft impacted the ground approximately 3.5 nm inbound from the threshold to runway 30L. All four occupants sustained fatal injuries.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The European Union Aviation Safety Authority (EASA)

SR47/2020

Review the requirements to register commercial operations under EASA Part-SPO *Specialised Operations*, to ensure that national civil aviation authorities, adopting these requirements, are provided with essential applicant information to enable an effective initial assessment of potential operational risks.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

SR48/2020

Introduce regulation requiring airborne image and audio recording systems in commercially operated light aircraft.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

Flight Calibration Services Limited (FCSL)

SR49/2020

Conduct a comprehensive review of the safety management system (SMS), and improve the system accordingly to assure:

- (a) a provision of feedback on the SMS effectiveness is contained within the system capabilities,
- (b) that specific roles are designated to specific personnel to manage the SMS with clear responsibilities and accountabilities, and
- (c) that the SMS is fully supported by the FCSL accountable manager and the management team.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

SR50/2020

Conduct a comprehensive review of the effectiveness of FCSL's pilot training with the aim of improving pilot competency in crew resource management and human factors with particular attention to pilot decision-making.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

SR51/2020

Improve the working processes to assess operational risks of newly declared EASA Part-SPO operators, and to verify continued compliance with the applicable requirements in accordance with EASA Air OPS ARO.GEN.300 Oversight (a)(2).

CAA Response:

The UK CAA accepts this recommendation. The UK CAA will carry out a full review of the SPO oversight process, procedures and policy and will carry out a review of SPO accountabilities (across multiple teams). The date set to accomplish both reviews is set for 31 December 2020. Following the outcome of the aforementioned reviews, the UK CAA will implement changes to; accountabilities, process, procedures and policy with the aim of Improving the working processes to assess operational risks of newly declared EASA Part-SPO operators, and to verify continued compliance with the applicable requirements in accordance with EASA Air OPS ARO.GEN.300 Oversight (a)(2). The date set to implement the changes is set for 30 April 2021.

CAA Status: OPEN

SR52/2020

Conduct a baseline assessment of the operational risks, and a thorough compliance and safety audit of FCSL's safety management system, flight operations, pilot training, weight and balance procedures, and documented procedures for calibration flights.

CAA Response:

The UK CAA accepts this recommendation. The scope of the next Part-SPO audit conducted by the UK CAA, which it is anticipated will be completed by the 30 September 2020, will focus on a baseline assessment and a thorough compliance and safety audit of FCSL's Safety Management System, flight operations, pilot training, weight and balance procedures, and documented procedures for calibration flights.

CAA Status: OPEN

Dubai Air Navigation Services (dans)

SR53/2020

Review and enhance the air traffic services manual and other relevant instructions that require air traffic controllers to consistently provide essential traffic information, including wake turbulence advice, to arriving and departing air traffic.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

SR54/2020

Review and enhance existing procedures for calibration flights to mitigate risk of wake turbulence encounters.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

Dubai Airports

SR55/2020

Review and enhance existing risk assessment and mitigation measures for calibration flights. The review should consider the possibility of inhibiting air traffic operations during calibration flights as a mitigation action.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

The General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates (GCAA)

SR56/2020

Ensure that air navigation service providers in the United Arab Emirates review working processes for air traffic controllers to consistently provide air traffic information, including wake turbulence advice, to arriving and departing air traffic.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

SR57/2020

Ensure that air navigation service providers in the United Arab Emirates review working processes for calibration flights at airports to ensure that the risk of wake turbulence encounters is mitigated.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

Transport Canada

SR58/2020

Conduct a safety study of the crashworthiness of the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) system installation on the Diamond DA62, and apply the necessary improvements identified to ensure that the system functions as intended by the aircraft design standards.

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA

End