

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

**SERIOUS INCIDENT INVOLVING BAE 146-RJ100, G-CFAF, NEAR BIRMINGHAM AIRPORT ON 1 OCTOBER 2004
(STICK SHAKER ACTIVATED WHEN FLAPS INADVERTENTLY RETRACTED INSTEAD OF LANDING GEAR)**

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F15/2006
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 10 May 2006
OPERATOR : BA CitiExpress
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2004/07116
AAIB REPORT : Bulletin 4/2006

SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

The crew had planned an instrument departure from Birmingham Airport using the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS), although they believed the Honiley VOR to be out of service. Shortly after takeoff, the crew observed indications showing that the Honiley VOR was serviceable and whilst confirming its identity, inadvertently retracted the flaps instead of the landing gear. When the aircraft was at about 750 ft agl, the stick shaker activated. The commander immediately reduced the pitch attitude and allowed the aircraft to accelerate to a safe speed and the co-pilot raised the landing gear. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The two Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2006-02

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourage operators to monitor possible mis-selections of gear and flap levers through established flight data monitoring programs in an attempt to identify the scale and severity of the problem.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. The CAA, through the UK FDM Operator's Group will alert them to the circumstances of this incident and encourage them to monitor possible mis-selections of gear and flap levers through their established FDM programmes. In addition, the CAA will ask the group for data concerning such mis-selections in an attempt to identify the scale and severity of the problem. The next meeting is scheduled for 6 June 2006.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2006-03

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority should provide up-to-date guidance to operators regarding the use of FMS for navigation purposes, keeping it under frequent review, and require operators to update their operations manuals in accordance with the latest guidance within a specified period.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this recommendation. The CAA has recently commenced a review of internal guidance material in relation to Area Navigation (RNAV) operations and CAA RNAV approval processes. Part of the output of the review will enable the CAA to publish a FODCOM containing guidance on the use of FMS for navigation purpose. The FODCOM will be published before the end of August 2006.

CAA Status - Open