

## **Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report**

**ACCIDENT TO SKYRANGER 912(1), G-CBWL, AT MANCHESTER BARTON AERODROME ON 8 JULY 2003  
(MIS-RIGGED AILERON CABLES CAUSED AIRCRAFT TO CRASH AFTER TAKEOFF)**

**CAA FACTOR NUMBER** : F51/2004  
**FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE** : 14 December 2004  
**OPERATOR** : Private  
**CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER** : 2003/04357  
**AAIB REPORT** : Bulletin 11/2004

### **SYNOPSIS**

(From AAIB Report)

Just after takeoff, at an estimated height of 40 feet, the aircraft was seen to roll to the left. The bank continued to increase to the point where the nose dropped and the aircraft descended and struck the ground in a steeply banked, nose down attitude. The aircraft came rapidly to a halt with the pilot trapped in the wreckage having suffered serious injuries. An engineering investigation revealed that the aileron cables had been rigged in the reverse sense to normal.

### **FOLLOW UP ACTION**

The two Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

#### **Recommendation 2004-48**

It is recommended that the PFA and the BMAA ensure that as aircraft, which are certificated to the requirements of BCAR Section S, continue in service, no degradation of any distinctive markings applied to flight control systems connections intended to minimise the possibility of cross connection of flight controls during the aircraft rigging process, occurs.

#### **CAA Response**

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

**CAA Status - Closed**

## **Recommendation 2004-49**

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority, in conjunction with the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) Section S steering group, amend the requirements so that all elements of the flight control systems of new aircraft types certified to BCAR Section S rely solely upon design features in order to prevent flying control cables or rods being cross connected during the aircraft rigging process.

### **CAA Response**

The CAA partially accepts this Recommendation. The CAA, in conjunction with the BCAR S Working Group, will, by the end of April 2005, review and consider an amendment to the requirements so that all elements of the flight control systems of new aircraft types certified to BCAR Section S rely solely upon design features in order to prevent flying control cables or rods being cross connected during the aircraft rigging process.

**CAA Status - Open**