

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO FOKKER FK100, G-UKFI, AT MANCHESTER AIRPORT ON 1 APRIL 2002

(SMOKE AND FUMES IN AIRCRAFT TAXYING OUT)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER : F7/2003
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE : 15 April 2003
OPERATOR : KLM UK
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER : 2002/01906
AAIB REPORT : Bulletin 3/2003

SYNOPSIS

(From the AAIB Report)

The aircraft was taxiing for takeoff from Runway 24R at Manchester International Airport on a scheduled passenger service to Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The weather was dry with a light southerly breeze. Sunrise was due at 0543 hrs and the sky was just becoming light.

Shortly after passing holding point 'J4', the flight deck crew became aware of a burning smell in the cockpit which was becoming stronger and which they described as smelling like "hot light oil". The commander brought the aircraft to a halt and instructed the first officer to set the APU, which was supplying bleed air to the air conditioning packs, to OFF. At about the same time, cabin crew member No 3 (CC3), who was situated in the middle of the aircraft at seat row 15, became aware of smoke in the cabin. There was no intercom handset at CC3's position. She therefore walked to the front of the cabin to inform the In-Flight Supervisor (IFS) who was in the forward galley with cabin crew member No 2 (CC2). As CC3 approached the forward galley, she was passed by CC2 returning to his normal crew position at the rear of the aircraft.

On being advised of the smoke, the IFS entered the cockpit and informed the flight deck crew. Very soon after this exchange, both cabin toilet smoke alarms activated and the cockpit crew received a Master Caution alert and 'TOILET SMOKE' message. CC2 was passing seat row 15 at the time the toilet smoke alarms activated, and he continued to the rear of the aircraft and inspected both toilets for any signs of fire. Having found none, he advised the IFS via the intercom, who relayed the information to the commander, together with the fact that the smoke was continuing to move forward and was getting thicker.

Meanwhile the flight deck crew had closed the engine bleed air switches, thereby cutting off all possible sources of conditioned air. Both pilots looked back along the cabin through the open cockpit door and both remember having difficulty seeing as far as the rear of the passenger cabin. Realising that the smoke showed no sign of dissipating, the commander decided to carry out an emergency evacuation. He told the IFS to standby for his evacuation order, whilst he and the first officer carried out the 'On Ground Emergency/Evacuation' checklist, which involved lowering full flap and shutting down the engines. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) indicated that one minute forty seconds had elapsed between the cockpit crew first smelling burning in the cockpit and the engines being shutdown.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The three Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2002-42

The CAA and the JAA should review the design, contrast and conspicuity of wing surface markings associated with overwing emergency exits on all relevant Public Transport aircraft, with the aim of ensuring that the route to be taken from the wing to the ground is marked unambiguously.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts its part of this Recommendation.

In conjunction with the operators of all relevant Public Transport aircraft on the UK register the CAA will review the design, contrast and conspicuity of wing surface markings associated with overwing emergency exits, with the aim of ensuring that the route to be taken from the wing to the ground is marked unambiguously. CAA will aim to complete this review by 30 October 2003.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2002-43

The CAA and JAA should review the requirements for passenger safety cards to ensure that, for aircraft with overwing exits, the safety card is required to clearly depict the emergency escape route(s) from the cabin, via the wing, to the ground.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts its part of this Recommendation.

The CAA has reviewed the requirements for passenger safety cards contained in Article 14(5)(c) of the Air Navigation Order (ANO) 2000 and in Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 360, Chapter 6, Section 3, paragraph 2.

The CAA contends that Article 14(5)(c)(iv), which states "The required notice shall contain pictorial information as to where emergency exits are to be found and instructions as to how they are to be used" already covers this requirement. However the CAA will, by way of amplification, amend CAP 360 Chapter 6, Section 3, paragraph 2 to include the text "escape routes – for aircraft with overwing exits, illustrations should clearly depict the emergency escape route(s) from the cabin, via the wing, to the ground". It is expected that the amended version of CAP 360 will be available in late 2003.

As an interim measure, Flight Operations Department Communication 1/2003 was published on 28 January 2003 recommending that Operators of aeroplanes with overwing emergency exits review the content of their passenger safety cards to ensure that the emergency escape routes from the cabin, via the wing to the ground, are clearly depicted. In March 2003 the CAA conducted a review of a small sample of passenger safety cards produced by UK operators having aircraft with overwing exits. The safety cards reviewed clearly depicted the emergency escape route(s) from the cabin, via the wing, to the ground.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2002-44

The CAA and JAA should review the requirements for flight and cabin crew training in respect of the operation of all available exits, to ensure that crew members are familiar with the operating procedures, and opening characteristics, in both the normal and emergency modes of operation.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts its part of this Recommendation.

The CAA will work together with the JAA to review the requirements for flight and cabin crew training in respect of the operation of all available exits to ensure that crew members are familiar with the operating procedures and characteristics in both normal and emergency modes of operation.

The JAA Flight Crew and Cabin Crew Study Group, of which the UK CAA has membership, has raised this issue with Central JAA requesting a mandate to review the JAR-OPS 1 requirements for crew member training in respect of the operation of exits. As an interim measure, Flight Operations Department Communication 1/2003 was published on 28 January 2003 recommending that Operators should review their training requirements for flight crew and cabin crew in respect of the operation of all available exits on aeroplane types to be operated to ensure that crew members are familiar with the operating procedures and opening characteristics both in normal and emergency modes.

CAA Status - Closed