

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

ACCIDENT TO SKYRANGER 912(1), G-CBWL, AT MANCHESTER BARTON AERODROME ON 8 JULY 2003 (MIS-RIGGED AILERON CABLES CAUSED AIRCRAFT TO CRASH AFTER TAKEOFF)

CAA FACTOR NUMBER	:	F51/2004
FACTOR PUBLICATION DATE	:	14 December 2004
OPERATOR	:	Private
CAA OCCURRENCE NUMBER	:	2003/04357
AAIB REPORT	:	Bulletin 11/2004

SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

Just after takeoff, at an estimated height of 40 feet, the aircraft was seen to roll to the left. The bank continued to increase to the point where the nose dropped and the aircraft descended and struck the ground in a steeply banked, nose down attitude. The aircraft came rapidly to a halt with the pilot trapped in the wreckage having suffered serious injuries. An engineering investigation revealed that the aileron cables had been rigged in the reverse sense to normal.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The two Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2004-48

It is recommended that the PFA and the BMAA ensure that as aircraft, which are certificated to the requirements of BCAR Section S, continue in service, no degradation of any distinctive markings applied to flight control systems connections intended to minimise the possibility of cross connection of flight controls during the aircraft rigging process, occurs.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

This publication provides the initial CAA response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport. Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation.

The current status and the final responses to all Safety Recommendations are contained in an annual CAA report entitled PROGRESS REPORT - CAA RESPONSES TO AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS. The absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed. This document is published by the Safety Investigation and Data Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Telex: 878753

Recommendation 2004-49

It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority, in conjunction with the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR) Section S steering group, amend the requirements so that all elements of the flight control systems of new aircraft types certified to BCAR Section S rely solely upon design features in order to prevent flying control cables or rods being cross connected during the aircraft rigging process.

CAA Response

The CAA partially accepts this Recommendation. The CAA, in conjunction with the BCAR S Working Group, will, by the end of April 2005, review and consider an amendment to the requirements so that all elements of the flight control systems of new aircraft types certified to BCAR Section S rely solely upon design features in order to prevent flying control cables or rods being cross connected during the aircraft rigging process.

CAA Status - Open