

Follow-up Action on Occurrence Report

INCIDENT INVOLVING LOCKHEED L188C, G-FIZU, 10 MILES SOUTH OF RENNES ON 7 JUNE 2001

(Crew Emergency Exit Door detached from aircraft during flight))

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SYNOPSIS

(From AAIB Report)

The aircraft was climbing out of Rennes, bound for Bordeaux, with all visual and audible flight deck indications normal when, upon passing FL40, a loud bang was heard. The aircraft shook violently and depressurised. The commander immediately initiated a return to the departure airfield and, suspecting that the aircraft may have sustained structural damage, transmitted a MAYDAY call. After carrying out all relevant emergency checks an uneventful ILS approach was made back into Rennes and the aircraft landed safely. Examination of the aircraft at Rennes showed that the Crew Emergency Exit Door (CEED) was missing.

Although this event occurred within French airspace, it was agreed with the French authorities that the investigation would be conducted by the AAIB. The aircraft was not examined by the AAIB in France, only upon its return to the UK after repair.

FOLLOW UP ACTION

The three Safety Recommendations, made by the AAIB following their investigation, are reproduced below, together with the CAA's responses.

Recommendation 2002-31

The Civil Aviation Authority, together with the Federal Aviation Administration, ensure that action is taken aimed at preventing the accidental detachment of the Crew Emergency Exit Door, in flight, on all Lockheed Electra L188C aircraft that have been modified to freighter configuration in accordance with the door manufacturer's Supplemental Type Certificate.

CAA Response

The CAA accepts this Recommendation.

As the authority of the State of Design the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have primary responsibility for the continued airworthiness of the Lockheed Electra L188C. On 14 January 2003 CAA wrote to the FAA and

This publication provides the initial CAA response to each Safety Recommendation made by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transport. Status 'CLOSED' or 'OPEN' indicates completion or not of all actions judged appropriate by the CAA in response to the Recommendation.

The current status and the final responses to all Safety Recommendations are contained in an annual CAA report entitled PROGRESS REPORT - CAA RESPONSES TO AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH (AAIB) SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS. The absence of errors and omissions cannot be guaranteed. This document is published by the Safety Investigation and Data Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House, Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR. Tel: 01293 573220 Fax: 01293 573972 Telex: 878753 proposed to them actions that they should consider taking aimed at preventing the accidental detachment of the Crew Emergency Exit Door, in flight, on all Lockheed Electra L188C aircraft that have been modified to freighter configuration in accordance with the door manufacturer's Supplemental Type Certificate. A reply from the FAA is awaited.

CAA Status - Open

Recommendation 2002-32

The Federal Aviation Administration should re-examine the manufacturer's Supplemental Type Certificate associated with the design of the installation of the Crew Emergency Exit Door on G-FIZU, to ensure that a DOOR UNSAFE indication is presented to the flight crew whenever the door is not properly locked closed.

CAA Response

This Recommendation is not addressed to the CAA.

CAA Status - Closed

Recommendation 2002-33

The Civil Aviation Authority, together with the Federal Aviation Administration, should ensure that when more than one modification, or Supplemental Type Certificate, is approved for similar additions or improvements on an aircraft type, then the method of operation of that modification should be clearly indicated, and information relating to its operation should be made readily available to flight and ground crews.

CAA Response

The CAA does not accept this Recommendation.

Existing airworthiness requirements reflect the fact that, where required, the method of operation of a modification should be clearly indicated, and information relating to its operation should be made readily available to flight and ground crews. Compliance is assessed in accordance with existing practices prior to CAA approval of a modification. Compliance is required whether there is one or more than one modification, or Supplemental Type Certificate, approved for similar additions or improvements on an aircraft type.

CAA Status - Closed